Somalia: Heading from Fragility to Fragmentation?

first published by AfricanArguments, 26 Jun 2014

Somalia has achieved important progress since the onset of the year of 2014. Most prominent among the positive developments is the push-back of al-Shabaab, realised by a joint military offensive of the Somali Armed Forces (SAF) and African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). While security remains precarious, the territorial gains have provided the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) with an oppor­tunity to extend its administrative reach – a crucial precondition for its long-term state­-building project and endeavour to hold country-wide elections by 2016.

However, it remains questionable whether the govern­ment of Prime Minister Abdiweli Sheikh Ahmed will succeed in reaping sufficient benefits in order to be able to propel the country’s state-building process. Although advances against the terrorist organisation are crucial, the fight against al-Shabaab constitutes only part of the equation. Another basic element lies in the process of erecting functional structures of governance in the context of Somalia’s federal agenda. Yet, recent quarrels at the sub-national level raise the fear that Somalia may be heading from fragility to fragmentation.

The EU-ISS policy brief ‘Somalia’s federal agenda: From fragility to fragmentation?’ takes a closer look at this proposition. The paper critically assesses the recent trajectory the country has embarked upon, putting a particular focus on Somalia’s federalism process and its implications for the state’s endeavour to establish lasting peace and stability. The paper shows that the political ‘transition’ that Somalia officially terminated with the formation of the FGS in September 2012 is in full swing, and that this process carries centrifugal tendencies that risk renewed conflict.

A key challenge Somalia faces lies in the ad-hoc nature of the process that underpins the formation of federal member states. While the evolution of regional tensions had to be expected, the resulting tug-of-war among Somali actors has hampered political progress. It also led to increased factionalism, propelling local tensions and clan-related cleavages. Somalia’s history provides ample evidence of the dangers this trajectory entails. Apart from compromising the state-building progress achieved to date, increased fragmentation could also lead to a reinvigoration of al-Shabaab, which has always been effective in exploiting local grievances and national disunity.

In order to prevent Somalia from sliding from fragility to fragmentation, the policy brief proposes that Somalia’s international partners may contemplate strengthening the central administration vis-à-vis the federal member states and supporting a just process by which federal polities are established. In part, this could be done by helping the FGS to institutionalise the process that underpins the formation of federal member states, and bolstering the Boundaries and Federation Commission that the Provisional Constitution tasked the FGS to create. This could be achieved by making it clear that international development funding to regional administrations will hinge on their prior approval by the FGS.

Moreover, the international community needs to ensure that its support towards Somalia’s national process of federalisation does not fuel internal conflict. One possibility lies in adopting a flexible process that provides the FGS with sufficient room for political manoeuvre, and hands ownership over the state-making process to the Somali people. Consequently, all donors should strongly adhere to the Somali Compact, as it continues to be the most suitable framework to assist the FGS in rebuilding basic and durable state functions. Even though the Somali Compact is not the silver bullet that will turn the long-time ‘failed state’ of Somalia into a stellar democracy, its principle tenets constitute an important step in reconstructing Somalia – not least by coordinating its international supporters.

More challenging, but of even greater importance, is the unification of the Somali people. For its part, the EU, in addition to its already significant contribution to the country’s security sector, might also consider the possibility of providing support for the establishment and the promotion of national political parties. Genuine political parties with convincing party programmes and an active followership that extends beyond a handful of Mogadishu-based politicians could prove to be valuable vehicles in attempts to transcend the sub-national purview of political entities, overcome age-old clan-based disputes, and provide viable platforms for national dialogue. Ultimately, a democratic trajectory for Somalia will be hard to achieve in the absence of both a unified national constituency and genuine political parties.

Not entirely unexpectedly, the advancement of Somalia’s federal agenda has proved to be a contentious process. The resulting fragmentation it has experienced, particularly in recent months, risks perpetuating and even exacerbating its fragility. In order to move forward constructively and overcome political instability, the country needs to start building institutions and identities that span regional and clan divides. Only then will Somalia stand a chance of achieving the ‘Vision 2016’ that the FGS devised last September.


Somalia’s hydrocarbon potential: Oiling or spoiling its future?

first published by AfricanArguments, 09 Jun 2014

Constituting the petroleum sector’s latest ‘frontier region’, Somalia constitutes not only one of the most promising, but also most challenging potential oil exporting countries. Whereas international enterprises face risks with regards to political fragility, legal ambiguity, and physical insecurity, Somalia looks down the barrel of the negative political, economic, and social effects of the ‘resource curse’. Moreover, the country also has to confront a variety of additional challenges that are certain to arise from oil exploration and production in the context of its nascent state-making endeavour. One key risk is that the development of its petroleum resources is likely to catalyse an already tense situation, enhancing the danger for violent conflict in the war-ravaged country. In order to oil rather than spoil ongoing processes of state-making and development in Somalia, all stakeholders involved need to exercise utmost caution in further developing Somalia’s hydrocarbon potential.

The recent resource bonanza in East Africa has not stopped at the borders of one of the most fragile states in the world. Instead, Somalia finds itself canvassed by a range of international oil and gas companies, which are attracted by the large profit margins that accrue from developing the fragile country’s hydrocarbon potential. Ever since the first well in Somali soil was drilled by Sinclair in 1945, a total of about seventy wells have been sunk in Somalia. After major oil companies had declared force majeure and abandoned the country in the years surrounding the end of the Cold War, newcomers have embarked on exploring the country’s hydrocarbon potential in recent years. Although information about Somalia’s fossil fuel endowments remain scant, they are estimated to be as high as 110 billion barrels, putting the state at the Horn of Africa at eye-level with Kuwait.

Consequently, stakes are high and the development of its natural resources holds significant potential for Somalia. To be sure, the geological formations that show striking parallels to those of oil-rich Yemen across the Red Sea, provide an opportunity to lift the destitute Somali nation above a per capita GDP of about USD 112 (current US Dollars; see UN Data). Yet, such a positive trajectory is by no means assured, as the development of Somalia’s hydrocarbon resources faces a host of serious challenges that could not only jeopardize the country’s oil production, but its very state-making. One challenge lies in the ‘resource curse’, others in the political competition among Somali stakeholders as well as legal ambiguities. Hence, the central question is whether and how the country’s natural endowments can be developed in a way that bolsters rather than thwarts its progress towards peace and development.

A recent policy brief entitled “Oil in Somalia – Adding Fuel to the Fire?” published by the Heritage Institute for Policy Studies in Mogadishu aims to address this question. Although the conundrum whether Somalia’s hydrocarbon endowments will ultimately be a boon or bane for its trajectory hinges on a multitude of variables and evades simple projection, the paper cautions against a ‘business as usual’ approach. Shedding some light on Somalia’s political, legal, economic, as well as social conditions, and assessing their preparedness to cope with the shocks and challenges that will accompany the development of hydrocarbon endowments, the policy brief points towards some of the central obstacles Somalia faces with regards to the development of its natural resource wealth. At its heart, the report argues that Somalia is ill-prepared to embrace the challenges posed by the extraction of oil, and that major progress in the political, technical, and administrative spheres needs to be made, if hydrocarbon production is to oil rather than spoil the country’s future.

Somalia: Challenged by Oil Production

One key challenge the production of oil and gas holds for Somalia lies in the economic realm. As is the case for many other developing countries, Somalia faces the risk of the ‘resource curse’. Yet, in the Somali context the challenges accruing from this phenomenon are exacerbated due to the extraordinary infancy of the country’s formal institutions and legal framework. Moreover, Somalia’s administration remains feeble and lacks a well-trained cadre of technocrats to appropriately deal with oil production and revenue management. And in the absence of a sizeable non-hydrocarbon economy, the country is unlikely to beneficially counter the adverse effects of the ‘Dutch disease’, which results in wage increases across the economy that hits tradable sectors such as agriculture and manufacturing particularly hard. Thus, from the perspective of economic development, the production of oil and gas seems to constitute a real danger for Somalia.

Another central defiance – and one that is more particular to the case of Somalia – lies in the socio-political sphere. Prospects for hydrocarbon discoveries have spurred a ‘resource race’ in which different political actors have started to carve up oil blocks in order to enhance their politico-economic bargaining power vis-à-vis political competitors. Consequently, this race for oil is likely to catalyse both existing and burgeoning rifts and political tensions at the sub-national level – particularly in an environment in which demands for federal state structures have gained momentum, and one which remains marred by significant legal ambiguities. The border clashes between security forces from Puntland and Somaliland in eastern Sanaag Region in April 2014 could prove to be but a first taster of the significant tensions and violent contestation that come in tandem with the exploration and production of Somalia’s hydrocarbon wealth.

But there are further obstacles to the beneficent development of Somalia’s natural resources that the report identifies. For one, hydrocarbon prospects are likely to attract the attention of other states, whose interest might not be well aligned with Somalia’s state-making endeavour. Kenya’s interest in Somalia’s oil resources appears to have been a key driver behind Nairobi’s 2011 decision to militarily intervene in Somalia, and the US government demanded its Somali counterpart to recognize the rights of US oil companies that had declared force majeure when the regime of dictator Mohammed Siyad Barre crumbled in 1991, prior to extending recognition in 2013. For another, the development of Somalia’s hydrocarbon endowments may also spark local tensions and undermine the Somali government’s endeavour to facilitate reconciliation at the local level. Finally, the study highlights the significant legal challenges and lack of clear constitutional framework, which might result in entrenched conflict among leaders of different political entities within Somalia.

Addressing the Defiance

In light of such challenges, the report concludes that it appears that oil exploration and production is likely to exacerbate an already difficult process of forging a functioning elite bargain and setting up transparent and reliable institutions in order to advance the country’s state-making endeavour. Consequently, the paper urges all actors involved in the process of hydrocarbon development to exercise a great deal of caution, in order to avoid adding fuel to the fire. More concretely, some of the recommendations voiced are:

First, the Federal Government of Somalia needs to address existing legal ambiguities and political points of contention. For one, Somali legislators should revise the country’s legislation that regulates the exploitation of natural resources. For another, the FGS must find a politically viable and binding solution to the question of who has the right to enter into – and the responsibility to honour – contracts with oil companies. Moreover, Somalia must investigate how to best acquire and sustain technical expertise and administrative capacity in order to effectively negotiate and manage oil agreements with international companies.

Second, Somali authorities, assisted by its international partners and oil production companies, should devise a strategy to actively manage public expectations emerging in relation to natural resource exploitation. Possibly, an interstate commission on natural resources could take on this task. By acting as a knowledge platform and drawing on experiences from other oil-producing countries with federal state structures, such a commission could also mediate among different levels of government and advise them on how to best move forward.

Third, international oil production companies need to take great caution not to upset the little progress towards state-making and development that Somalia has achieved throughout the recent past. Apart from strictly abiding to Somalia’s national laws, international companies should await the conclusion of political and legislative proceedings at the part of Somali authorities, before production initiatives forward. Concurrently, the international donor should consider investing much more strongly into the establishment of a productive economy in Somalia, and explore possibilities of using aid funds in such ways as to smoothen out volatile government budgets that are certain to fluctuate if Somalia becomes increasingly dependent on oil revenues.

For Somalia, the road towards the development of its hydrocarbon potential is winding and full of challenges. The country’s fragile political situation, weak institutions, legal immaturity, and host of further obstacles raise doubts as to whether it is well-prepared to embrace the obstacles that come with hydrocarbon development. In order not to add fuel to the fire, but to make greatest use of the country’s hydrocarbon potential, a great deal of caution is required from all parties involved. Only if oil exploitation is seen as a means to the end of establishing a viable state, rather than an end in itself, can Somalia’s hydrocarbon endowments possibly oil rather than spoil its future trajectory.


Somalia’s Federal Agenda May Get Boost With New Regional President

first published by the United States Institute of Peace, 17 Jan 2014

The third presidential election in Somalia’s semi-autonomous state of Puntland has brought about a change in leadership that might help enhance stability in the Horn of Africa. While it is too early to predict how the shift will ultimately play out in the region, the election of Abdiweli Mohamed Ali Gaas may prove a crucial catalyst for Somalia’s stalled process toward federalism.

On Jan. 8, Puntland’s newly sworn-in parliament of 66 members rallied in the northeastern region’s capital of Garowe for presidential elections. The semi-autonomous polity had reverted to having its president elected by clan-appointed legislators after local elections were canceled last July due to risks of violence and the democratic process stalled. With eight of the 11 candidates eliminated in the first round of voting, Acting President Abdurahman Mohamed Farole won the second round comfortably. Yet, the third and final round saw Gaas emerge as the winner, defeating the incumbent narrowly with 33 to 32 votes.

Farole’s defeat may not have been anticipated, but the changing of the guard follows the unwritten principle of rotating leadership among an informal triumvirate of Puntland’s three major Majerteen sub-clans. The polity’s first president (Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, 1998-2004) was a representative of the Omar Mohamoud sub-clan; its second president (Mohamoud Muse Hersi, 2005-2009) belonged to the Osman Mohamoud; and the third president (Abdurahman Mohamed Farole, 2009-2014) originated from the Isse Mohamoud. Hence, it was again the turn of the Omar Mohamoud sub-clan of Majerteen to rise to the helm of the state.

Yet Gaas did not succeed merely on the basis of clan arithmetic. A trained economist, Gaas looks back on a formidable political career. Most recently, he served as Prime Minister of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) under Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed. During his term (2011-2012), Gaas helped devise the formal “roadmap” that led to the official conclusion of Somalia’s “transition,” and culminated in the establishment of today’s Federal Government of Somalia. This experience is particularly valuable, as one of the key tasks for new leadership in Puntland is advancing the region’s transition towards multiparty democracy.

Against the backdrop of his narrow victory and given significant social tensions, one of Gaas’ first concerns, however, will be the unification of the Majerteen clan. Moreover, he will be expected to forge a more inclusive political settlement that incorporates other tribal factions, such as the Dhulbahante.

Sidelined under President Farole, the Dhulbahante currently hold 17 of the 66 seats in Parliament, and are likely to demand a satisfactory solution to the complex issues surrounding the Sool and Sanaag regions. Having been contested by Somaliland and Puntland for years, disgruntled Dhulbahante founded the Khatumo state in 2012, receiving some support from the central government. While Gaas vowed, in his first press conference, to prioritize the improvement of the region’s security situation, strengthening public institutions and initiating economic recovery are among the other urgent tasks the president-elect needs to tackle at home.

Simultaneously, the new leader will have to address federal politics. Indications are that Gaas will try to repair Puntland’s relations with the central government, after Farole had cut all ties with Mogadishu in August 2013. Already Gaas’s presidential campaign, in contrast to that of his predecessor, was based on a platform of enhanced cooperation with the nation’s capital.

Even though many Puntlanders are unhappy with the federal administration, Gaas’s course of reconciliation is likely to gain traction locally. This is not least because, by and large, the Majerteen would like to retrieve their historically rooted political influence in Somalia. Besides, in recent years Gaas has proven that he has greater political ambitions, not least evidenced by his candidacy during the 2012 presidential elections in Somalia. Hence, it seems probable that he will be committed to constructively advance Somalia’s federal agenda.

The international community will probably respond favorably to such a political course. Combined with the fact that Gaas is likely to benefit from international optimism over Puntland’s peaceful election, he will enter into future negotiations with Somalia from a position of considerable strength.

The combination of renewed political stamina and moves toward federalism comes as a double-edged sword for the semi-autonomous Puntland; a careful balance needs to be struck between the priorities of Garowe and Mogadishu. That said, Puntland is unlikely to suffer its resources being siphoned off to the extent that had been the case under the region’s first president, Ahmed.

Puntland’s revival at the federal level is likely to result in an alliance with a burgeoning and assertive administration in Jubaland to the south – at least in voice, if not in substance. The two regions not only share close kinship because their populations largely trace their descendants back to the Darood, but they are also united in their demand for federalism. The potential alliance could backfire if the federal government and other interest groups feel they’re being backed into a corner. The result could be a resumed stalemate.

Yet, strengthened federal units appear more likely to be a boon for Mogadishu, in that the central administration will have more responsive and cooperative counterparts in the regions than has been the case recently. Furthermore, while an increasing influence of the Darood in federal politics comes with its own set of challenges, it might lead to much-needed enhanced cooperation within the Hawiye clan family, which dominates central Somalia in demographic and political terms.

While a scenario of constructive cooperation between Garowe and Mogadishu seems more likely at this point, questions over resource management will pose a test. After all, Puntland is home to the Dharoor and Nugaal faults, which are believed to contain approximately 20 billion barrels of oil.

In the end, the trajectory of Puntland and its impact on other Somali entities will largely hinge on the team Gaas puts together in the coming weeks. The constitution grants him 21 days from his election to form a government.

Dominik Balthasar is a Trans-Atlantic Post-Doctoral Fellow for International Relations and Security (TAPIR) at USIP. He wrote his PhD thesis at the London School of Economics on conflict and state trajectories in Somalia.